A Computational Modeling Strategy for Levels
(DRAFT)Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this
paper sketches an approach to the problem of levels which swaps assumptions about ontology for
assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational
modeling techniques which will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to
save some of our prominent common sense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a
way of exploring the individuation of higher-level properties in a systematic and formally
constrained manner.
1. Physicalist approaches to levels. The notion that the world is divided into levels is a vague
but prominent feature of our commonsense intellectual apparatus. It also serves as the central
presupposition of most attempts to articulate a metaphysical framework for non-reductive
physicalism. In addition to its role in discussions concerning the ontological status of higher-level
properties, the notion of levels regularly figures in debates concerning the character of the special
sciences. So-called higher-level sciences like economics and psychology are generally regarded
as less authoritative than lower-level sciences like physics and chemistry. This relative inferiority
of the soft or special sciences over the hard and maximally general sciences has been a matter of
ongoing discussion in philosophy of science for decades.
Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this paper sketches an approach to the problem of levels which swaps assumptions about ontology for assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational modeling techniques which will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to save some of our prominent common sense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a way of exploring the individuation of higher-level properties in a systematic and formally constrained manner.
1. Physicalist approaches to levels. The notion that the world is divided into levels is a vague but prominent feature of our commonsense intellectual apparatus. It also serves as the central presupposition of most attempts to articulate a metaphysical framework for non-reductive physicalism. In addition to its role in discussions concerning the ontological status of higher-level properties, the notion of levels regularly figures in debates concerning the character of the special sciences. So-called higher-level sciences like economics and psychology are generally regarded as less authoritative than lower-level sciences like physics and chemistry. This relative inferiority of the soft or special sciences over the hard and maximally general sciences has been a matter of ongoing discussion in philosophy of science for decades.
Read PDF
Leave a Trackback