Explanation, representation and the dynamical hypothesis
Minds and Machines 11: 521-541, 2001
Abstract. This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license
the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by
syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue
that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations.
My suggestion is that we treat linguistic and representational structures as providing complex
multi-dimensional targets for the development of individual brains. This approach acknowledges the
indispensability of the intentional or representational idiom in psychological explanation without
locating representations in the brains of intelligent agents.
Abstract.
This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My suggestion is that we treat linguistic and representational structures as providing complex multi-dimensional targets for the development of individual brains. This approach acknowledges the indispensability of the intentional or representational idiom in psychological explanation without locating representations in the brains of intelligent agents.
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