Functionalism and Fallibility
Southwest Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind rests on the claim that mental states are multiply
realizable; mental states can be realized by or instantiated in a variety of distinct physical
structures. To see them as multiply realizable we take mental states as causal roles rather
than particular physical structures. As such, functionalism can be contrasted with
metaphysical accounts which treat mental states as instances of a mental substance.
Instead of puzzling over the relationship between mental and physical kinds,
functionalists understand our talk of minds as a way of describing the functions of bodies.
The attraction of a functionalist position is obvious. It seems to solve the traditional
problem of mind-body dualism, while simultaneously reconciling the apparent
irreducibility of psychological discourse with a broadly physicalistic or materialistic
ontology.
Functionalism has been challenged insofar as it fails to capture the kind of
phenomenal knowledge that results from qualitative experience. While this line of
criticism is powerful, I contend that it derives from a more basic weakness of the
functionalist position. We can grasp this more basic problem by examining the
relationship between functionalism as a metaphysical position and the intuitive
assumption that it is possible to engage in progressive inquiry into the nature of minds.
At its root, philosophical functionalism requires a stable theory of mind. Inquiry, by
contrast, depends on the possibility that we might improve our theories and that, assuch,
there are features of our current theory of mind which we are likely to abandon.
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind rests on the claim that mental states are multiply realizable; mental states can be realized by or instantiated in a variety of distinct physical structures. To see them as multiply realizable we take mental states as causal roles rather than particular physical structures. As such, functionalism can be contrasted with metaphysical accounts which treat mental states as instances of a mental substance. Instead of puzzling over the relationship between mental and physical kinds, functionalists understand our talk of minds as a way of describing the functions of bodies. The attraction of a functionalist position is obvious. It seems to solve the traditional problem of mind-body dualism, while simultaneously reconciling the apparent irreducibility of psychological discourse with a broadly physicalistic or materialistic ontology.
Functionalism has been challenged insofar as it fails to capture the kind ofphenomenal knowledge that results from qualitative experience. While this line of criticism is powerful, I contend that it derives from a more basic weakness of the functionalist position. We can grasp this more basic problem by examining the relationship between functionalism as a metaphysical position and the intuitive assumption that it is possible to engage in progressive inquiry into the nature of minds. At its root, philosophical functionalism requires a stable theory of mind. Inquiry, by contrast, depends on the possibility that we might improve our theories and that, as such, there are features of our current theory of mind which we are likely to abandon.
Read PDF
Leave a Trackback