Wheres the Bridge? Epistemic logic and Epistemology
Philosophical Studies (2006)128:137-167 (with Vincent Hendricks)
1. INTRODUCTION
Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday
talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features
that we can track and reflect upon. Epistemic logicians
have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure
in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s.
However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists
have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the
marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology
with the centrality of modal logic for metaphysicians.
This article is intended to help in correcting this oversight by
presenting some important developments in epistemic logic
and suggesting ways to understand their applicability to traditional
epistemological problems. Obviously, by itself, tweaking
the formal apparatus of epistemic logic does not solve
traditional epistemological problems. Epistemic logic can help
us to navigate through problems in a systematic fashion by
unpacking the logic of the problematic concepts, it can also
lead us to recognize problems that we had not anticipated.
This is basically analogous to the role that modal logic has
played in contemporary metaphysics.
In the pages that follow, three prominent sets of connections
between epistemic logic and traditional epistemology
will be sketched. Epistemic logic permits formal consideration
of the kind of strategies that are available to us in responding
to skepticism. It permits a detailed grasp of the social and
temporal character of inquiry and of course it allows us
insight into the problem of defining the class of scenarios
compatible with what someone knows. This last problem is
Philosophical Studies (2006) 128:137–167 Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-4060-0
itself equivalent to the problem of explicitly defining the concept
of knowledge.
1. INTRODUCTION
Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features that we can track and reflect upon. Epistemic logicians have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s. However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology with the centrality of modal logic for metaphysicians. This article is intended to help in correcting this oversight by presenting some important developments in epistemic logic and suggesting ways to understand their applicability to traditional epistemological problems. Obviously, by itself, tweaking the formal apparatus of epistemic logic does not solve traditional epistemological problems. Epistemic logic can help us to navigate through problems in a systematic fashion by unpacking the logic of the problematic concepts, it can also lead us to recognize problems that we had not anticipated. This is basically analogous to the role that modal logic has played in contemporary metaphysics.
In the pages that follow, three prominent sets of connections between epistemic logic and traditional epistemology will be sketched. Epistemic logic permits formal consideration of the kind of strategies that are available to us in responding to skepticism. It permits a detailed grasp of the social and temporal character of inquiry and of course it allows us insight into the problem of defining the class of scenarios compatible with what someone knows. This last problem is itself equivalent to the problem of explicitly defining the concept of knowledge.
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