John F Symons » Article/Chapters http://johnfsymons.com Just another WordPress weblog Sat, 01 May 2010 02:54:24 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 en hourly 1 The individuality of artifacts and organisms. http://johnfsymons.com/2010/04/the-individuality-of-artifacts-and-organisms/ http://johnfsymons.com/2010/04/the-individuality-of-artifacts-and-organisms/#comments Sat, 01 May 2010 02:52:40 +0000 johnsymons http://johnfsymons.com/?p=208 Symons – the individuality of organisms and artifacts

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2010/04/the-individuality-of-artifacts-and-organisms/feed/ 2 Some Comments on Susana Badiola’s “Necessity and the A priori: a Traditional Link Revisited” http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/some-comments-on-susana-badiola%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9cnecessity-and-the-a-priori-a-traditional-link-revisited%e2%80%9d/ http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/some-comments-on-susana-badiola%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9cnecessity-and-the-a-priori-a-traditional-link-revisited%e2%80%9d/#comments Wed, 24 Mar 2010 21:44:42 +0000 johnsymons http://johnfsymons.com/?p=204 Comments on Susana Badiola’s paper for NMWT 2010

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/some-comments-on-susana-badiola%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9cnecessity-and-the-a-priori-a-traditional-link-revisited%e2%80%9d/feed/ 0 Game Theoretical Semantics as the Basis of a General Logic (With Jaakko Hintikka) http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/game-theoretical-semantics-as-the-basis-of-a-general-logic-with-jaakko-hintikka/ http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/game-theoretical-semantics-as-the-basis-of-a-general-logic-with-jaakko-hintikka/#comments Tue, 16 Mar 2010 04:28:54 +0000 johnsymons http://johnfsymons.com/?p=199 Game theoretical semantics as the basis of a general logic march15 2010

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2010/03/game-theoretical-semantics-as-the-basis-of-a-general-logic-with-jaakko-hintikka/feed/ 1 Logic and formal semantics for epistemology http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/logic-and-formal-semantics-for-epistemology/ http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/logic-and-formal-semantics-for-epistemology/#comments Wed, 24 Feb 2010 04:51:42 +0000 johnsymons http://johnfsymons.com/?p=194 LogicandFormalSemanticsforEpistemologyLongversion

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/logic-and-formal-semantics-for-epistemology/feed/ 1 The Individuality of Organisms and Artifacts http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/the-individuality-of-organisms-and-artifacts/ http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/the-individuality-of-organisms-and-artifacts/#comments Thu, 18 Feb 2010 23:45:05 +0000 johnsymons http://johnfsymons.com/?p=182 In recent decades, advances in molecular biology have made the artificial selection of biological functions a familiar part of contemporary civilization: Just as we can whittle a stick into a spear, biologists can now modify an organism to become a factory for fuel or pharmaceuticals. The success of genetic engineering may encourage us to see the distinction between artifacts and organisms as a vestige of our benighted vitalist past. However, in spite of the impressive power of contemporary bio-engineering, our old intuitions concerning the difference between organisms and artifacts still have some content. This paper argues that there is a meaningful difference between organisms and artifacts, that this difference involves the character of their individuality.

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2010/02/the-individuality-of-organisms-and-artifacts/feed/ 0 A Computational Modeling Strategy for Levels http://johnfsymons.com/2009/12/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels/ http://johnfsymons.com/2009/12/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels/#comments Mon, 14 Dec 2009 05:46:56 +0000 brandonon http://johnfsymons.adobetree.com/?p=43 Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this paper sketches an approach to the problem of levels which swaps assumptions about ontology for assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational modeling techniques which will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to save some of our prominent common sense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a way of exploring the individuation of higher-level properties in a systematic and formally constrained manner.

1. Physicalist approaches to levels. The notion that the world is divided into levels is a vague but prominent feature of our commonsense intellectual apparatus. It also serves as the central presupposition of most attempts to articulate a metaphysical framework for non-reductive physicalism. In addition to its role in discussions concerning the ontological status of higher-level properties, the notion of levels regularly figures in debates concerning the character of the special sciences. So-called higher-level sciences like economics and psychology are generally regarded as less authoritative than lower-level sciences like physics and chemistry. This relative inferiority of the soft or special sciences over the hard and maximally general sciences has been a matter of ongoing discussion in philosophy of science for decades.

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2009/12/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels/feed/ 0 A Sketch of the History and Methodology of Ontology in the Analytic Tradition http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-sketch-of-the-history-and-methodology-of-ontology-in-the-analytic-tradition/ http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-sketch-of-the-history-and-methodology-of-ontology-in-the-analytic-tradition/#comments Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:59:59 +0000 brandonon http://johnfsymons.adobetree.com/2009/11/a-sketch-of-the-history-and-methodology-of-ontology-in-the-analytic-tradition/ Part 1: Introduction
 The analytic tradition is sometimes criticized as being narrowly focused on language, logic or conceptual analysis to the detriment of deeper investigations into ontological, metaphysical or moral questions. More specifically, analytic philosophy has been associated with an obsequiously deferential relationship to mathematics and the natural sciences. While this line of criticism obscures the historical reality and contemporary diversity of the analytic tradition, it is true that analytic philosophers have generated some of the severest criticisms of traditional metaphysics. Many early analytic philosophers, in particular those who were part of or influenced by the Vienna Circle, tended to identify metaphysics with obscurantist cultural tendencies. Philosophers like Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick were motivated by the ideal of a philosophical practice which was guided by the kinds of intellectual virtues which they thought were exemplified by the natural sciences. Science seemed to offer a more appealing and progressive example of intellectual activity than the kinds of traditional philosophy with which they were familiar. The sciences, they thought, offer a model of clarity, openness and internationalism which stood in stark contrast to, for example, the ontological rumblings that members of the Vienna circle heard coming from Heidegger’s hut. Heideggerian forms of ontology, were anathema to the refugees from fascism who helped to shape philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century.

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-sketch-of-the-history-and-methodology-of-ontology-in-the-analytic-tradition/feed/ 0 Computational Models of Emergent Properties http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/computational-models-of-emergent-properties/ http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/computational-models-of-emergent-properties/#comments Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:59:59 +0000 brandonon http://johnfsymons.adobetree.com/2009/11/computational-models-of-emergent-properties/ 1. Introduction
Computational modeling plays an increasingly important explanatory role in cases where we
investigate systems or problems that exceed our native epistemic capacities. One clear case
where technological enhancement is indispensable involves the study of complex systems.1
However, even in contexts where the number of parameters and interactions that define a problem
is small, simple systems sometimes exhibit non-linear features which computational models can
illustrate and track. In recent decades, computational models have been proposed as a way to
assist us in understanding emergent phenomena.
The core concern of this paper centers on the following question: Assuming that
emergent properties are a genuine feature of the natural world, how might computational models
help us to generate explanatory accounts of those properties? Putatively emergent properties such
as the flocking behavior of birds, (Reynolds 1988) the adaptive features of the immune systems
(Hofmyer et al 2000) and the characteristic patterns of traffic flow (Schreckenberg 1995) have
been given computational models. In what sense (if any) do such models help to explain the
respective emergent features under consideration?

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/computational-models-of-emergent-properties/feed/ 0 Detecting emergence in the interplay of networks http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/detecting-emergence-in-the-interplay-of-networks/ http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/detecting-emergence-in-the-interplay-of-networks/#comments Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:59:59 +0000 brandonon http://johnfsymons.adobetree.com/2009/11/detecting-emergence-in-the-interplay-of-networks/ Abstract
We present a formal framework for the identification and
interpretation of emergent properties in environments where
agents participate in distinct kinds of relations or networks.
We focus here on the interplay between social and
geographic relations in the behavior of our agents. The
method we present provides a way to detect emergent
properties in the interaction of distinguishable forms of
network. Our initial models suggest that characterizing the
emergent properties of the behavior of a complex
communication network allows for the explanation of
dynamics in geographic and other dimensions. Additionally,
we hypothesize the emergence of territory-like features
which have consequences for the behavior of agents at both
social and spatial levels. We distinguish our approach from
what we call macro-level accounts of emergence and
present two case studies in which we apply some of the
formal strategies discussed.

Abstract

We present a formal framework for the identification and interpretation of emergent properties in environments where agents participate in distinct kinds of relations or networks. We focus here on the interplay between social and geographic relations in the behavior of our agents. The method we present provides a way to detect emergent properties in the interaction of distinguishable forms of network. Our initial models suggest that characterizing the emergent properties of the behavior of a complex communication network allows for the explanation of dynamics in geographic and other dimensions. Additionally, we hypothesize the emergence of territory-like features which have consequences for the behavior of agents at both social and spatial levels. We distinguish our approach from what we call macro-level accounts of emergence and present two case studies in which we apply some of the formal strategies discussed.

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/detecting-emergence-in-the-interplay-of-networks/feed/ 0 A Computational Modeling Strategy for Levels http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels-2/ http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels-2/#comments Tue, 01 Dec 2009 07:59:59 +0000 brandonon http://johnfsymons.adobetree.com/2009/11/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels-2/ Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this
paper sketches an approach to the problem of levels which swaps assumptions about ontology for
assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational
modeling techniques which will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to
save some of our prominent common sense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a
way of exploring the individuation of higher-level properties in a systematic and formally
constrained manner.
1. Physicalist approaches to levels. The notion that the world is divided into levels is a vague
but prominent feature of our commonsense intellectual apparatus. It also serves as the central
presupposition of most attempts to articulate a metaphysical framework for non-reductive
physicalism. In addition to its role in discussions concerning the ontological status of higher-level
properties, the notion of levels regularly figures in debates concerning the character of the special
sciences. So-called higher-level sciences like economics and psychology are generally regarded
as less authoritative than lower-level sciences like physics and chemistry. This relative inferiority
of the soft or special sciences over the hard and maximally general sciences has been a matter of
ongoing discussion in philosophy of science for decades.

Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this paper sketches an approach to the problem of levels which swaps assumptions about ontology for assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational modeling techniques which will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to save some of our prominent common sense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a way of exploring the individuation of higher-level properties in a systematic and formally constrained manner.

1. Physicalist approaches to levels. The notion that the world is divided into levels is a vague but prominent feature of our commonsense intellectual apparatus. It also serves as the central presupposition of most attempts to articulate a metaphysical framework for non-reductive physicalism. In addition to its role in discussions concerning the ontological status of higher-level properties, the notion of levels regularly figures in debates concerning the character of the special sciences. So-called higher-level sciences like economics and psychology are generally regarded as less authoritative than lower-level sciences like physics and chemistry. This relative inferiority of the soft or special sciences over the hard and maximally general sciences has been a matter of ongoing discussion in philosophy of science for decades.

]]> http://johnfsymons.com/2009/11/a-computational-modeling-strategy-for-levels-2/feed/ 0